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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates disclosure practice of extraordinary items (EI) by
listed companies in Malaysia during which the original standard on EI, SI
8 – Unusual and Prior Period Items and Changes in Accounting Policies
was still in place. Until the adoption of the revised standard in 1997 (revised
SI 8 and subsequently replaced by the MASB 3), the definition of EI given
in the original SI 8 was very loose and it was opened to abuse. This paper
also reports on whether EI disclosures were associated with income smoothing
behaviour and the extent to which disclosure of EI was related to political
costs, gearing and management interest. A total of 244 Kuala Lumpur Stock
Exchange (KLSE) listed companies that disclosed EI at least once from 1991
to 1995 were included in this study. The study found that the incidence of EI
was very high. However, the results showed no evidence of management
using EI as a tool to smooth income. Further, EI disclosures were not
explained by political costs, gearing and management interest. As there was
no evidence of the use of EI to smooth income in Malaysia, the belief that
the new standard (that restricts the definition of EI) would curb the practice
of income smoothing is not relevant. The adoption of the new standard could
only be expected to enhance the level of reporting comparability and
consistency among Malaysian companies.
ABSTRAK
Kertas ini mengkaji amalan pendedahan item luar biasa oleh syarikat yang
tersenarai di Bursa Saham Kuala Lumpur (BSKL) di mana ketika itu
piawaian asal berkaitan item luar biasa iaitu SI 8 – Unusual and Prior
Period Items and Changes in Accounting Policies masih digunakan. Definisi
yang diberi oleh SI 8 bagi item luar biasa adalah longgar dan terdedah
kepada penyalahgunaan sehinggalah SI 8 yang disemak semula digunapakai
dalam tahun 1997 dan diikuti oleh piawaian  MASB 3. Artikel ini melaporkan
sama ada pendedahan item luar biasa ini mempunyai hubungan dengan
gelagat pelicinan pendapatan. Ia juga melaporkan sejauh mana pendedahan
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item luar biasa ini mempunyai hubungan dengan kos politik, penggearan
dan pemegangan saham pengurusan syarikat. Kajian dilakukan ke atas 244
syarikat yang tersenarai di BSKL yang melibatkan syarikat yang telah
membuat pendedahan item luar biasa sekurang-kurangnya sekali di antara
tahun 1991 hingga 1995. Kajian mendapati amalan pendedahan item luar
biasa adalah tinggi. Walau bagaimanapun hasil kajian menunjukkan tiada
bukti bahawa pengurusan syarikat menggunakan item luar biasa untuk
melicinkan pendapatan. Pendedahan item luar biasa ini juga tidak dijelaskan
oleh kos politik, penggearan dan pemegangan saham pengurusan syarikat.
Oleh itu tanggapan bahawa piawaian yang diterima pakai sebagai alat
untuk menghalang amalan pelicinan pendapatan adalah tidak relevan kerana
di Malaysia tiada bukti  bahawa item luar biasa digunakan untuk melicinkan
pendapatan. Justeru itu, piawaian baru dijangka hanya boleh digunapakai
untuk meningkatkan paras kebolehbandingan dan keseragaman pelaporan
di kalangan syarikat di Malaysia.
INTRODUCTION
The use of extraordinary items (EI) by management has been the subject of
extensive investigation: see Jordan, Henderson and Gordan (1990), Lynn
and McGuinness (1995) and Choo and Lee (1998). Accounting standard
setting bodies elsewhere such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board,
the Accounting Standard Board and the Australian Standard Review Board
have made significant changes to their earlier standard dealing with
extraordinary items in an attempt to curb the potential abuses largely arising
from the very loose definition of items considered as EI.
In Malaysia, EI was originally contained in SI 8 – Unusual and Prior
Period Items and Changes in Accounting Policies, following an adoption of
IAS 8 issued by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC).
The Standard was made effective by the Malaysian Institute of Accountants
(MIA) in January 1987. Upon revision of the Standard by the AISC, the MIA
adopted the new revised standard and issued it as SI 8 (Revised) – Net Profit
or Loss for the Period, Fundamental Errors and Changes in Accounting
Policies, in January 1997. Following establishment of the Malaysian
Accounting Standards Board (MASB) in 1997, the revised standard was
approved and reissued as MASB 3 - Net Profit or Loss for the Period,
Fundamental Errors and Changes in Accounting Policies in July 1999. For
the purpose of this paper, the revised Standard will be referred to as MASB
3 and the original Standard as SI 8.
Where EI is concerned, SI 8 dealt with the definition of EI and its
disclosure guidelines. The adoption of this standard by MIA was seen as an
attempt to improve the accounting standards in Malaysia in line with the
standards in developed countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom and
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the United States of America. The accounting standards that deal with EI in
these countries restrict the interpretation of items that fall within the
definition of EI. Thus, the adoption of the revised standard is seen as a step
to harmonise the accounting standards and to facilitate comparability of
financial information among Malaysian companies. More importantly, the
issuance of the revised standard was seen as an attempt to curb an alleged
abuse, namely that management used EI as a loophole to smooth or even to
manipulate earnings since the definition of the items in SI 8 was left to the
discretion of the management.
In SI 8, extraordinary items were defined as “… gains and losses that
derive from events or transactions that are distinct from the ordinary
activities of the enterprise and therefore are not expected to recur frequently
or regularly” (para 3). In this broad definition, what constitutes ordinary
activities is left to the management to define. Thus, the very “open” nature
of the definition has given rise to inconsistency in reporting financial
performance among companies over time. Thus, the issue of potential abuse
by management to use EI to inflate or deflate the reported earnings is of a
major concern.
However, in MASB 3 (previously revised SI 8), the reporting of
extraordinary items is more restrictive in which a clear definition of EI was
provided.  In MASB 3, EI have been defined as “… income or expenses that
arise from events or transactions that are clearly distinct from the ordinary
activities of the enterprise and therefore are not expected to recur frequently
or regularly.” (para 6 of MASB 3). The word “clearly” was added to the
definition before the phrase “ordinary activities” to make it more specific.
To ensure that the use of EI is not being abused, the standard states that
“Virtually all items of income and expense included in the determination of
net profit or loss for the period arise in the course of the ordinary activities
of the enterprise” and that “… only on rare occasions does an event or
transaction give rise to an extraordinary item”(para 12 of MASB 3).
Consequently, the Standard provides only two examples of events or
transactions that generally fall into extraordinary items, namely assets’
expropriations, and earthquake or natural disasters (para 14 of MASB 3).
Nevertheless, paragraph 18 states that “When items of income and expense
within profit or loss from ordinary activities are of such size, nature and
incidence that their disclosure is relevant to explain the performance of the
enterprise for the period, the nature and amount of such items should be
disclosed separately”. The standard, in paragraph 20, further provides
circumstances that warrant separate disclosure in accordance with paragraph
181.
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STUDY OBJECTIVES
This paper attempts to investigate the disclosure practice of EI and to
determine whether EI is used as a tool to smooth earnings in Malaysia. To
date, no such study has been conducted in Malaysia. Much of the evidence
on EI is from developed economies. For instance, Lynn and McGuinness
(1995) showed that, over a period of five years, 61.2 percent of the
companies in Hong Kong had at least reported EI once, and the yearly
incidence rate for EI ranged from 25 to 36 percent. An even higher incidence
rate was recently observed. For instance, Choo and Lee (1998) reported that
85.9 percent of the Singaporean companies reported EIs from 1992 to 1994.
These findings suggest a high degree of EI disclosure by companies.
In particular, this paper attempts to investigate the following issues:
• The incidence of EI among Malaysian companies.
• The nature of EI among Malaysian companies.
• The relationship between EI and income smoothing.
• The relative size and incidence of EI against size, gearing and
management ownership.
The findings of the paper provides evidence as to the nature, extent and
explanations of reporting of EI among the Malaysian companies during
period prior to adoption of the revised standard (which was subsequently
adopted as MASB 3). The findings are useful to predict the characteristics of
companies that are likely to get around MASB 3 in order to enable them to
report EI.  In fact, it has been noted that, during the exposure draft (ED)
stage, the “… proposed change of the ED has caused much criticism.” (Ng
1996, p. 11). The author (Ng 1996, p. 11) argued that “… many reporting
entities in Hong Kong have refused to comply with the restriction despite
the consequence of qualified audit reports.” For instance, the Institute of
Certified Public Accountants of Singapore (ICPAS) experienced strong
objections from the business community when the Provisional Statement of
Accounting Standard (PAS) 19 dealing with EI was issued in 1994 to replace
the Statement of Accounting Standard 8 (SAS 8) (Choo and Lee 1998). The
PAS 19 was subsequently withdrawn on 29 December 1995. Though this
study investigated during the period prior to the adoption of “more restrictive”
definition of EI, there are still many countries which have not adopted the
revised standard of EI issued by IASC. Thus, the findings of this study will
be useful to these other countries in understanding the reporting of EI and
its link with income smoothing.
This paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the
underlying literature and presents the hypotheses. This is followed by a
section that describes the sample selection, data collection procedures, and
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the methods used to test the hypotheses. The results are then presented and
in the final section, the discussion and conclusion will end the paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
MASB 3 is regarded as consistent with the all-inclusive concept of income.
Under the concept, all transactions that result in a net increase or decrease
in the shareholders’ interest during the period, other than dividends or
capital transactions, are to be included in determining the net income for the
period. However, to facilitate earnings predictability and thus to minimise
earnings variability, transactions are further categorised into ordinary and
non-ordinary. Thus, non-ordinary and infrequent transactions (commonly
known as EI) are presented below the line (i.e. after taxes). Moreover, due
to their infrequency and non-ordinary in nature, it is expected that analysts
do not place a heavy weightage on EI in determining a firm’s earnings
permanence. Rather, items that are trading in nature and are expected to
consistently contribute to the firm’s current and future earnings are to be
given higher weightage (Shamsul Nahar 1999).
Nonetheless, the issue on the presentation of EI remains controversial.
One argument is that market is perceived to be functionally-fixated, where
all the numbers presented in the financial statements are taken as they are
without making any necessary adjustments. According to Belkoui (1992: p.
150):
The functional fixation and naïve investor hypotheses assume that a sufficient
number of investors are unable to perceive the cosmetic nature of certain accounting
changes or are “fixated” on the bottom figure of net income.
Existing evidence, to some extent, supports the contention (e.g. Healy and
Palepu 1993, 1994). In fact, the concept of impression management, as
argued by Ayres (1994) also seems to lend support to the contention.
However, in the literature, the market is said to be informed and is not
easily fooled by the cosmetic accounting differences or accounting changes
(Belkoui 1985: p.128). Kaplan and Roll (1972), for instance, showed that
the market reacted indifferently to the inventory valuation procedures that
inflate earnings without tax consequences. Perhaps, due to the sophisticated
nature of users, a low incidence rate in EI (13.5 percent) was observed in the
United States (Jordan et al. 1988). Given that the Malaysian environment
more resembles that of the Singapore and Hong Kong environments, which
reported a high EI incidence rate, we would expect that the incidence rate of
EI will be high as well, relative to that in the US.
As for management’s tendency to use EI as the vehicles to manipulate
earnings, we could offer several reasons. First, the present definition of EI
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is very broad and it is open to abuse. The use of EI offers not only the
amount but also the timing of the recognition. Thus, given the amount of net
income that is achievable for the period and the amount of targeted net
income preset early in the period, the management may use EI to achieve the
target. Second, EI are used in anticipation of future earnings. If the
management foresees that future years are bleak, it may be better to transfer
future earnings in the forms of EI to the current years. In fact, Lynn and
McGuinness (1995) argued that the high incidence rate of EI among the
Hong Kong companies was due to the uncertainty after 1997. Third,
management uses EI as an effective tool to “smooth” earnings, and thus,
earnings are spread evenly over periods. Greater fluctuations in earnings
over the periods will make it difficult for the market to predict the earnings
with accuracy. Earnings variability was, in fact, shown to positively and
significantly influence the incidence of income smoothing (Beattie, Brown,
Ewers, John, Manson, Thomas & Turner 1994). In fact, it has been argued
that the use of EI was motivated by the fact that it would either enhance the
reliability of the trend data of ordinary income in predicting the firm’s cash
flow or eliminate the noise from the ordinary income (Barnea, Ronen &
Sadan 1975). Nonetheless, based on the evidence found in their study,
Demsey, Hunt and Schroeder (1993) concluded that there was a greater
tendency for firms to report losses as EI and gains as ordinary income. This
approach would effectively inflate the income from operations. Thus, the
evidence may suggest that management attempts to disguise the “true”
ordinary income for the period.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the following hypothesis is to be
tested in this study:
H1: The incidence of EI is positively associated with income smoothing.
Previous studies have also shown that large percentages of increase in
earnings, particularly in large firms, can attract unwelcome interference by
the Government through, for instance, the withdrawal of subsidies or taxes
(Craig and Walsh 1989) or even the firm’s monopoly power (Watts and
Zimmerman 1986). Watts and Zimmerman (1986) earlier argued that political
visibility could lead to an unfavourable response from the Government.
Thus, large reported earnings by large firms could lead to the Government’s
withdrawal of certain concessions given to the firms. Given the expected
unfavourable interventions from the Government or even the labour unions,
the firm’s size, as proxy for political costs, was found to be positively and
significantly associated with the incidence of income smoothing. However,
Beattie et al. (1994) did not find evidence supporting their contention of a
positive and significant influence of political visibility on income smoothing.
Perhaps, the use of sales as a measure of political costs had driven the
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insignificant findings. In another related study, Craig and Walsh (1989), who
used market capitalisation as an indicator of the tendency of income
smoothing, provided evidence consistent with the contention of positive
association between firm size and the incidence of income smoothing.
This leads to the following hypotheses:
H2a: The relative size of EI is greater for larger firms than for smaller firms.
H2b: The incidence of EI is greater for larger firms than for smaller firms.
Likewise, the presence of a high degree of debts in the firm is also
predicted to be positively associated with the incidence of income smoothing.
Evidence has shown that financial statements were used to fulfill the
purpose of monitoring the debt contracts (see Smith and Warner 1979;
Leftwich 1980), which serve as the device to restrict the behaviour of the
management. Thus, the level of leverage signifies the closeness to breaching
the debt covenants. Moreover, high probability of breaching the covenants
could lead to greater likelihood of expected costs of default and or
renegotiation (Beattie et al. 1994). Their evidence showed that the influence
of level of gearing on income smoothing was positive and significant, which
was consistent with their proposition.
Based on the above arguments, the following hypotheses warrant testing
in this study:
H3a: The relative size of EI is greater for larger gearing firms than for
smaller gearing firms.
H3b: The incidence of EI is greater for larger gearing firms than for smaller
gearing firms.
In the agency theory framework, separation between owner-manager has
been argued to result in divergent interests (Jensen and Meckling 1976). To
align the divergent interests, contracts are often written so that the agency
costs are minimised. Two agency costs are often referred to, namely agency
costs of equity and agency costs of debts. Thus, it is predicted that the higher
the degree of management ownership, the lower the degree of the divergence
of interests and so are the agency costs, and vice-versa. Therefore, lower
management ownership level leads to the creation of contracts that are
intended to restrict the opportunistic behaviour of the management. High
management ownership leads to an alignment of management incentives
with those of outside shareholders (Niehaus 1989). The evidence, for
instance, by Warfield, Wild and Wild (1995), supports the contention.
Nonetheless, greater management ownership could also lead to managerial
labour market and market for corporate control mechanisms becoming less
effective (Beattie et al. 1994). This contention has earlier been empirically
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shown by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988). Thus, the direction of the
relationship between management ownership and income smoothing is not
determinate.
Thus, the foregoing discussions lead to the following hypotheses:
H4a: The relative size of EI is greater for firms with smaller management
ownership than for firms with greater management ownership.
H4b: The incidence of EI is greater for firms with smaller management
ownership than for firms with greater management ownership.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data were collected from publicly available sources. To identify companies
that disclosed EI in their annual reports, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange
(KLSE) Companies Annual Handbook comprising financial statements for
the period from 1991 to 1995 inclusive, were investigated. Companies listed
on the Main Board of the KLSE with complete financial statements from
year 1991 to 1995 were considered in the study. Consequently, companies
that disclosed EI at least once within the time frame were included in the
sample.
Subsequently, annual reports over the financial years 1991 to 1995 of
the sample companies were examined to determine the amount and nature
of the extraordinary items. As EI could either be gains (positive) or losses
(negative), the proportion test was carried out to determine the dominant
sign of the EI. The test would enable the researchers to determine whether
there was a clear direction of EI or it just happened at random. Moreover,
the test would enable the researchers to determine whether gains or losses
were systematically reported, as concluded by Dempsey et al. (1993).
The identification of the nature of EI reported by each company is a
difficult exercise due to the fact that most companies reported more than one
nature of EI in a particular year. After going through the annual reports, the
nature of the EI was subsequently classified into nine major categories, as
shown in Table 1. The nature of EI being identified for a particular company
in a particular year is one whose absolute amount is at least fifty percent of
the greater of the sum of all positive EI or the sum of all negative EI in
absolute amounts. A company would be considered to have other uses
(category 9) if neither of the EI falls into the major categories identified or
none of the items satisfy the fifty percent criterion.
Subsequently, data from a sample of firms that disclosed EI in the
annual reports over the five year-period were gathered with respect to profits
before extraordinary items (PBE) and profits after extraordinary items
(PBE+EI). The presence of income smoothing would be evident if the
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coefficient of variation of profits before extraordinary items (CVPBE) was
significantly different from the coefficient of variation of profits after
extraordinary items (CVPAEI). This was accomplished by comparing their
means using a t-test.
Political costs, gearing and management ownership were measured by
the firm’s market capitalisation, debt to equity ratio and management
shareholding respectively. Data on the market capitalisation, debt and equity
were obtained from the KLSE Companies Annual Handbook. Management
shareholding was measured by aggregating the percentage of equity interest
owned by the firm’s executive directors. To test H
2a
, H
2b
, H
3a
, H
3b
, H
4a
, and
H
4b, 
a median score of each of the variables would be used as a cut-off point
to segregate sample firms into two categories: high and low with respect to
political cost, gearing and management interest. Median was used as it
would split the observations into two about equal number of cases.
Subsequently, t-tests on the difference in the mean values of EI of each
group would be conducted to determine if the relative size of EI (i.e.
REX=EI/PBEI) was related to political costs, gearing and management
ownership of a company.
To determine if the incidence of EI would have any link with political
costs, gearing and management ownership of the firms, the incidence of EI
(termed as COUNT) reported during the five-year period for each firm was
initially counted. The value of COUNT would range from 1 to 5. The mean
values of market capitalization, debt to equity ratio and management
shareholding of each firm throughout the five-year period were used to
measure political cost, gearing, and management ownership respectively. A
median score of each of the variables was used as a cut-off point to
segregate sample firms into high and low categories with respect to political
cost, gearing and management interest. Subsequently, a t-test on the difference
between the mean of COUNT in each of the high and low groups of the
variables was performed.
TABLE 1.  Nature of Extraordinary Items
Code Item
1 Sales/disposal of long term investments
2 Sales/disposal of property, plant and equipment
3 Goodwill written off
4 Compulsory acquisition of property by government
5 Write-down of assets to recoverable amount
6 Discontinues operation
7 EI in associated companies
8 Expenses related to listing and issue of securities
9 Others
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RESULTS
As of 31 December 1995, a total of 369 companies were listed on the KLSE
Main Board. A total of 284 companies had their financial results published
in the KLSE Companies Annual Handbook for the years 1991 to 1995, and
out of this, 244 companies (85.9%) disclosed extraordinary items at least
once in their income statements. This figure closely resembled that found in
Singapore (Choo and Lee 1998). A breakdown of the percentages for the
respective years is depicted in Table 2. Only the 244 companies that reported
extraordinary items at least once in their 1991 to 1995 income statements are
considered for further analysis. The occurrence rates were high, ranging
from 54.8 percent (in 1992) to 60.6 percent (in 1994).
TABLE 2.  Incidence rate of EI in the income statement of
companies listed on the KLSE
No. of companies listed on the KLSE Main
Board as of 31 December 1995: 369
No. of companies with complete financial reports (1991 – 1995): 284
No. of companies with complete financial reports (1991 – 1995),
reporting EI at least once: 244
Incidence rate of EI 85.9
 1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
No. of companies reporting EI (row 1) 170 171 193 211 215
No. of available companies with
financial statements (row 2) 284 312 324 348 362
Percent of companies r
eporting EI (row 1/ row 2) 59.9 54.8 59.6 60.6 59.4
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics, results on the direction of EI and
the proportion test conducted for each of the five years. The results suggest
that companies showed greater tendency to report positive EI rather than
negative figures. This dominance of EI with positive signs was supported by
the significance found in the proportion test for all the years. This finding
is therefore consistent with those found in Hong Kong and Singapore by
Lynn and McGuinness (1995) and Choo and Lee (1998), respectively.
Hence, companies in Malaysia are more likely to report positive EIs as
opposed to those in the US (Jordan et al. 1988).
Table 4 shows the results of the nature, occurrence rates of EI reported
by the companies (in Panel A) and test on the presence of income smoothing
(in Panel B). Results in Panel A of Table 4 show that the disposals of
investments and fixed assets account for more than fifty percent of the
occurrences of EI. One explanation for this phenomenon is that disposal of
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TABLE 3. Descriptive Statistics
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Mean EI 9,892 6,465 17,953 15,974 18,096
Standard Deviation EI (in RM ‘000) 52,291 37,412 54,019 45,123 49,679
Positive Sign 99 98 116 117 111
Negative Sign 62 56 54 59 56
Zero 83 90 74 68 77
% Positive Sign 61.5 63.6 68.2 66.5 66.5
% Negative Sign 38.5 36.4 31.8 33.5 33.5
Proportion Test .228* .282* .382* .33* .33*
Note: *p<.05 (2-tailed)
TABLE 4. Nature, occurrence rate of EI and use of EI to
smooth income Panel A: Nature of EI
Code* 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
1 34.8% 39.0% 42.2% 48.0% 48.2%
2 14.3% 19.2% 13.7% 14.5% 13.7%
3 4.3% 6.8% 7.5% 4.0% 5.4%
4 5.0% 2.7% 5.6% 4.6% 6.5%
5 13.7% 8.2% 3.7% 3.5% 6.0%
6 1.2% 2.7% 4.3% 4.0% 2.4%
7 3.7% 4.1% 3.7% 6.4% 4.8%
8 6.2% 1.4% 1.2% 4.0% 3.0%
9 16.8% 15.9% 18.1% 11.0% 10.0%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Note: * Refer to Figure 1 for label
Panel B: Use of EI to smooth income
Coefficient of Variation Cases Mean Std. Dev. T-value Sig.
Before EI  244  .3621  4.2973  .378  .706
After EI 240 .4809 2.3145
fixed assets is clearly outside of a firm’s ordinary activities. Thus, it was
conveniently classified as EI. This finding is consistent with those of Lynn
and McGuinness (1995) and Choo and Lee (1998) who found that asset sale/
discontinuance was the prominent nature of EI by companies in Hong Kong
and Singapore respectively. Thus, the argument proposed by Lynn and
McGuinness (1995) that the disposal of fixed assets contributes to the
dominance of the positive EI is applicable in Malaysia.
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The t-test comparing the mean scores of the CoV for profits before EI
(CVPBE) and the CoV for profits after EI (CVPAEI) for each of the periods
showed that the mean difference between the two scores was not statistically
significant, as shown in Panel B of Table 4. Therefore, H1 was rejected. The
finding, thus, did not support the contention that EI was used as a tool to
smooth income which is consistent with the findings in the studies by Lynn
and McGuinness (1995) and Choo and Lee (1998) for Hong Kong and
Singapore companies respectively.
TABLE 5. Comparison of relative size of EI (REX) by firm size,
gearing, management interest
Panel A: H2a: Firm’s Size
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Mean (low) -1.7760 .2507 -6.9336 .4.2580 .0974
(n=79) (n=75) (n=84)  (n=87) (n=83)
Mean (high) 8124 .7741 1.6702 .6894 .8240
(n=82) (n=76) (n=85) (n=89) (n=84)
T-value 1.106 .698 .772 -1.177 1.884
P-value .27 .486 .441 .241 .061*
Note: * p<.10 (2-tailed)
Panel B: H3a: Firm’s Gearing
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Mean (low) .1827 -.0253 -6.0650 1.8077 .7685
(n=80) (n=76) (n=85)  (n=88) (n=84)
Mean (high) -1.0902 1.0499 .8944 3.0992 .1536
(n=81) (n=78) (n=84) (n=88) (n=83)
T-value -.542 1.442 .624 .424 -1.590
P-value .588 .151 .534 .672 .114
Panel C: H4a: Management Interest
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Mean (low) -1.4014 -.0752 4.2075 4.2410 .4796
(n=79) (n=76) (n=84) (n=87) (n=83)
Mean (high) .4515 1.0985 -9.3438 .7060 .4464
(n=82) (n=78) (n=85) (n=89) (n=84)
T-value .790 1.576 -1.218 -1.165 -.085
P-value .430 .117 .225 .245 .932
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The remaining hypotheses, H2a, H2b, H3a, H3b, H4a
 
and H4b were
also tested using t-tests. The median scores of firm’s size, gearing and
management interest were used as the cut-off point to segregate companies
into high/low in size, gearing and management interest. Consequently, the
mean score of EI for each category was compared to determine if (high/low)
size, (high/low) gearing and (low/high) management interest link with (high/
low) relative value of EI. Table 5 presents results of the t-tests.
TABLE 6. Comparison of relative size of EI (REX) by firm size, gearing and
management interest (between the 1st and the 3rd sub-groups
with 2nd sub-group being deleted)
Panel A: H2a: Firm’s Size
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Mean (low) -3.2885 -.1268 -10.5847 5.2745 .0282
(n=53) (50) (n=56) (n=58) (n=55)
Mean (high) 1.0995 .2712 2.3007 .5470 .3317
(n=53) (n=53) (n=57) (n=59) (n=56)
T-value -1.115 -.845 -.771 1.053 -1.782
P-value .267 .400 .442 .295 .078*
Note: * p<.10 (2-tailed)
Panel B: H3a: Firm’s Gearing
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Mean (low) .3501 .1318 -6.9986 2.0043 .5909
(n=53) (n=50) (n=56) (n=59) (n=56)
Mean (high) 1.4550 1.5225 .7088 5.0367 .2062
(n=53) (n=54) (n=57)  (n=57) (n=55)
T-value 1.425 -1.284 -.465 -.672 .741
P-value .156 .202 .643 .503 .298
Panel C: H
4a
: Management Interest
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Mean (low) .5877 -.2997 5.0046 5.7357 .3395
(n=59) (n=52) (n=56) (n=59) (n=56)
Mean (high) .4617 .7261 -14.5852 .5006 .4741
(n=55) (n=51) (n=5852) (n=58) (n=55)
T-value .248 -1.084 1.181 1.153 -.260
P-value .805 .281 .240 .251 .796
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Results in Table 5 (Panel A) reveal that size, with the exception of 1995,
does not have any significant bearing on the relative size of EI. Consequently,
H2a is not supported. This evidence is consistent with that of Lynn and
McGuinness (1995) in Hong Kong. Thus, a firm’s size does not have any
significant role on EI in Malaysian companies. Similarly, both gearing and
management interest were also found to be unrelated to EI as shown in Panel
B and C. Therefore, H3a and H4a are not supported either.
Further analysis was carried out by splitting the observations into three
equal number of cases and subsequently comparing only between the first
(i.e. low) and third (high) sub-groups. This exercise would minimize the
potential for confounding effects from the middle “grey” sub-group. Results
of the analysis are presented in Table 6.
Results in all panels (A, B and C) are generally identical to those found
in Table 5. Thus, all the variables (i.e. political costs, gearing and management
interest) do not have significant bearing on the disclosure of EI. Thus, H2a,
H3a and H4a are not supported.
TABLE 7. Frequency of Incidence (COUNT)
COUNT* Frequency Percent (%)
1 46 18.9
2 32 13.1
3 38 15.6
4 39 16.0
5 89 36.5
Total 244 100.0
Note: * mean COUNT = 3.38
TABLE 8. Comparison of incidence rate of EI by firm size,
gearing, management interest
Firm Size Gearing Management
Interest
Mean (low) 3.2951 3.2295 3.2049
(n=122) (n=122) (n=122)
Mean (high) 3.4672 3.5328 3.5702
(n=122) (n=122) (n=121)
T-value .873 1.543 1.859
P-value .383 0.124 0.064*
Note: *p<.10 (2-tailed)
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Finally, Table 7 presents the distribution of COUNT across the firms
over the five-year period. The incidence rate is considered high where over
fifty percent of the companies disclosed EI at least four times during the
five-year period. Results on the association between the incidence of EI
(COUNT) and the three variables are presented in Table 8. The results
suggest that (low/high) management interest is the only variable that is
associated with the (low/high) incidence of EI. Thus, H4b is supported. The
other two hypotheses (i.e. H2b and H3b) relating size and gearing to the
incidence of EI are not supported. The result on size is therefore consistent
with that found by Lynn and McGuinness (1995) in Hong Kong.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper investigated the incidence and nature of EI among Malaysian
listed companies as well as the use of EI as a tool to smooth income. Results
showed that 85.9 percent of the companies with complete financial statements
from 1991 to 1995 disclosed EI in their annual reports. This shows that the
incidence rate of EI in Malaysia was as high as in Singapore (i.e. 85.9
percent) as reported by Choo and Lee (1998), and higher than that observed
in Hong Kong (i.e. 61.2 percent) by Lynn and McGuiness (1995). The very
loose definition of EI outlined in the original SI 8 might have contributed to
this widespread use of EI in these countries. This is evident by the variety
in nature of EI found during the period of our study.
Nonetheless, gains (losses) arising from disposal of assets accounted for
more than fifty percent of the overall nature of EI Gains from disposal of
assets might have contributed to the dominance of positive EI, which might
have explained the dominance of positive EI The dominance of positive EI
contradicts the conclusion made by Dempsey et al. (1993), who claimed that
firms showed greater tendency to report losses as EI and gains as part of the
firm’s ordinary income. The evidence, nonetheless, was consistent with the
findings by Lynn and McGuiness (1995) and Choo and Lee (1998). Thus,
this finding refutes the contention that management manipulates EI to inflate
ordinary earnings. Perhaps, as the findings showed, the dominant nature of
EI which arose principally from disposal of assets had caused the Asian
companies to not report losses as much as their US counterparts would
normally do.
The very restrictive definition of EI contained in the Revised SI 8
(which was subsequently adopted by MASB and known as MASB 3 in 1999)
did not seem to support the contention that its adoption was intended
primarily to curb management manipulative behaviour. This is because our
evidence suggests that management did not use EI as a tool to inflate
ordinary income. In fact, the predominance of the positive EI suggests that
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management does not inflate ordinary income viaEI. Had the management
intended to inflate ordinary earnings, we would have found that the
predominant directions of EIwould have been negative. Our evidence also
suggests that EI was not used as a tool of smooth income. Thus, the
prevailing belief that management uses EI to smooth earnings is unfounded.
Hence, the question that comes naturally is: Where EIis concerned, is there
a need for the original SI 8 to be superceded by the revised SI 8? The fact
that PAS 16 was short-lived in Singapore may help answer this question.
Moreover, the study by Lynn and McGuinnes (1995) suggests that “… their
inclusion as a part of operating income in the future should not necessarily
make forecasting more difficult.” (p. 72). Therefore, it does not seem to
matter whether EI is reported above the line or below the line as they have
no significant informational content. Nevertheless, the adoption of MASB 3
will make financial reporting among companies more comparable though at
the expense of a more erratic reported income. Further, as argued by
Dechow and Skinner (2000), earnings management will not be viewed as
problematic if capital market participants could obser ve (and are able to
make the necessary adjustments) at low cost. They further argue that if a
particular accounting policy is sufficiently disclosed in the footnotes,
sophisticated investors are expected to be able to understand the consequences
of such policies on the stock prices (Dechow and Skinner 2000).
The findings also showed that (high/low) size, (high/low) gearing and
(low/high) management interest did not link to (high/low) EI However, the
study shows that (low/high) management interest was related to (low/high)
incidence of EI. The direction of this finding is not the direction that we had
predicted. This evidence contradicts the agency theory, which argues that
high management interest leads to lower tendency to manipulate earnings
and therefore a lower incidence of EI was predicted. Hence, a high incidence
rate of EI for high management interest is perplexing. This unexpected
finding may be reconciled by the earlier findings by Morck et al. (1988) who
found that there was a curvilinear association between management interest
and the value of the firm. Their evidence showed that when management
interest was within the range of five to twenty-five percent, there was a
negative association between management interest and the value of the firm.
This finding may suggest that when the management owns an interest
between 5-25 percent, the management would tend to report higher earnings
via EI (for instance, through disposals of assets). Data in this study showed
that over the five year period, the annual average of management interest
ranged between 13.65 percent (1991) to 14.59 percent (1995) and it therefore
falls within the specified range  (i.e., 5-25 percent) as suggested by Morck
et al. (1988).
The findings also showed that the reporting of EI in a firm’s annual
report is not associated with income smoothing as evidenced by the
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insignificant difference between earnings without EI and earnings with EI.
The findings are generally in congruence with those found in Hong Kong
(Lynn and McGuiness 1995), and in Singapore (Choo and Lee 1998). This
implies that companies were very unlikely to use EI to manipulate income.
Finally, this study offers evidence with regard to EI disclosures prior to
the adoption of the Revised SI 8. Further study may be carried out to
determine the extent of compliance by Malaysian companies following the
adoption of the Revised SI 8 (i.e. now MASB 3, post-1999 periods) and
perhaps to investigate avenues that a firm would use to get around the more
restricted definition of EI. It is expected that one possible avenue for
continued reporting of EI is by changing the name of extraordinary items to
exceptional items (or abnormal items) which is not defined in any standard.
Finding from such a study would further reveal the reporting practice among
Malaysian companies which could be useful to the standard-setters.
ENDNOTES
1. Circumstances that warrant separate disclosures in accordance with
paragraph 18, MASB 3 include: (a) the write-down of inventories to net
realisable value or property, plant and equipment to recoverable amount,
as well as the reversal of such write-downs; (b) a restructuring of the
activities of an enterprise and the reversal of any provisions for the costs
of restructuring; (c) disposals of items of property, plant and equipment;
(d) disposals of long-term investments; (e) discontinued operations; (f)
litigation settlements; and (g) other reversals of provision.
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